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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW ANARCHY: ZICHERMAN V.
KOREANAIR LINES DISMANTLES THE WARSAW SYSTEM
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007,
en route from the United States to South Korea, accidentally
strayed into Soviet airspace.1 The flight crew recognized the dan-
ger but, fearing discipline by KAL, refused to return to Anchor-
age.2 A short time later, a Soviet aircraft intercepted and shot
down the jet.3 Two hundred and sixty-nine passengers and crew
members died in the disaster.4 There were no survivors.
The families of the victims filed multiple suits against KAL.
The plaintiffs' claims were governed by the Warsaw Convention,5
which provides a remedy for accidents such as the KAL disaster,
occurring on flights between signatory nations.6 Article 17 of the
Treaty provides for airline liability as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the dam-
age so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 7
1. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 116 S. Ct. 629, 631 (1996).
2. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 991 (1991) [hereinafter In re KAL].
3. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 631.
4. See id.
5. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 12 (1933) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention]. The terms "Treaty" and "Convention" will also be used to refer to the
Warsaw Convention throughout this Note.
6. See id. For a list of signatories to the Warsaw Convention see U.S.C.S. IN-
TERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 341-42 (Law. Co-op. 1995).
7. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, (unofficial English
translation). The official French text reads:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de bles-
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After a trial and a verdict for the plaintiffs, the federal district
court considered the type and amount of damages to award.8 In
addition to financial loss, the surviving family members claimed
and received nonpecuniary damages, including survivors' grief,
emotional distress, and loss of society.9 The federal court of ap-
peals reversed and set aside some of the nonpecuniary damages. 10
Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, the mother and sister,
respectively, of Flight 007 victim Muriel Kole, appealed the denial
of loss of society damage to the U.S. Supreme Court claiming that
the Warsaw Convention permits such damages. The validity of
their claim rested on the meaning of the term dommage survenu
(damage sustained) found in Article 17.
In January of 1996, the Supreme Court rendered its decision
sure ou de toute autre i6sion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque I'accident
qui a caus6 le dommage s'est produit A bord de I'adronef ou au cours de toutes
operations d'embarquement et de d~barquement.
Id. art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3005, 137 L.N.T.S. at 22.
8. In the absence of willful misconduct by the airline, the Warsaw Convention limits
a plaintiff's liability to $75,000. See Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving In-
creases in Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, reprinted in
49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1994) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement]. In the Flight 007 cases, a
jury found that KAL acted with willful misconduct. See In re KAL, 932 F.2d at 1477; see
also Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. at 3006, 137 L.N.T.S at 26.
On January 8, 1997, the U.S. Department of Transportation approved the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA) Intercarrier Agreement (IIA), the Agree-
ment on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (MIA), and the Pro-
visions Implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be Included in Conditions of
Carriage and Tariffs (IPA). See D.O.T. Order No. 97-1-2 (January 8, 1997). These
agreements, negotiated between the United States, the IATA and the Air Transport As-
sociation of America (ATA), provide for unlimited international air carrier liability and
liability without fault for damages up to 100,000 SDRs (Special Drawing Rights), the
equivalent of approximately $146,000. See Desmond T. Barry, Jr. & Thomas J. Whalen,
Unlimited Liability: The New Ball Game in International Transportation by Air, 64 DEF.
COUNS. J. 381, 382-83 (1997). These recent agreement are inapplicable to the KAL 007
cases.
9. The U.S. Supreme Court defines loss of society as encompassing "a broad range
of mutual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued existence, in-
cluding love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort and protection." Sea-
Land Svcs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). Courts award monetary damages as an
attempt to compensate victims for this kind of injury. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 952-53 (5th ed. 1984)
(commenting on the intangibility of loss of society and the absurdity of equating it with
pecuniary loss). Although a person who has suffered a loss from an intentional or negli-
gent tort cannot be "made whole"-that is, rendered as physically or emotionally fit as if
the accident had not happened at all-the law endeavors to make these victims as
"whole" as is possible with money damages. See JOHN T. BLANCHARD, CALIFORNIA
REMEDIES 420 (1995).
10. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 43 F.3d 18,21-23 (2d Cir. 1994).
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in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines.11 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Antonin Scalia refused to find that the words dom-
mage survenu, had their own independent meaning in the Treaty.
The Court found that the words provided "nothing more than a
pass-through, authorizing [the Court] to apply the law that would
govern in the absence of the Warsaw Convention. ' 12 In reaching
its decision, the Court held that the governing domestic law was
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).13 The Court applied
DOHSA because the Flight 007 disaster occurred "beyond a ma-
rine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Colum-
bia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States.
'14
Under DOHSA, however, plaintiffs may not recover nonpecuniary
damages.15 Thus, the Court eliminated the loss of society damages
from Zicherman's and Mahalek's recovery.
The implications of the Zicherman decision, however, extend
beyond the narrow issue of loss of society damages. The applica-
tion of DOHSA eliminates all types of nonpecuniary damages. 16
DOHSA however, does not exclusively define damages because
not all international aviation accidents occur on the high seas.
Depending upon the circumstances of the accident, Zicherman po-
tentially imposes various state and federal laws to define the dam-
ages recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. This application
defeats the relevant objectives of the Warsaw Convention, includ-
ing uniformity, deterrence of willful misconduct, and the attain-
ment of equity between passengers and airlines.
This Note analyzes the effect of the Zicherman decision on
the Warsaw system. Part II reviews the facts of Zicherman, and
Part III presents a brief overview of the Warsaw Convention. Part
IV examines the Zicherman decision, followed by its ramifications
in Part V. Part VI analyzes Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, exam-
ining Article 17 with the method of treaty interpretation dictated
by customary international law. This method requires fulfillment
of the Treaty's purposes, which this Note identifies. Because the
11. 116 S. Ct. at 629.
12. Id. at 636.
13. Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 761-67 (1994).
14. Id. § 761. The Court has held that DOHSA applies to airplane crashes. See Ex-
ecutive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 263-64 (1972).
15. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 762; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,
625-26 (1978).
16. In Zicherman, KAL only challenged the loss of society damages. Zicherman, 116
S. Ct. at 636 n.4.
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Zicherman Court's interpretation runs contrary to the purposes of
the Warsaw Convention, Part VI provides an alternative interpre-
tation. Part VII argues that Congress should enact legislation to
implement a uniform and fair interpretation of the Treaty. Such
legislation would result in more consistent rulings, ensure fairness
among litigants, mitigate the anarchy, and shorten the protracted
legal process that currently exists.
II. THE FACTS OF ZICHERMAN V. KOREAN AIR LINES
KAL Flight 007 never arrived in Seoul, South Korea as
scheduled.17 Early reports stated that Soviet Air Force planes had
forced the Boeing 747 to land on Sakhalin Island and that the pas-
sengers were safe. 18 Eighteen hours later, 19 however, U.S. Secre-
tary of State, George Schultz, announced that a Soviet military jet
had shot down Flight 007,20 killing all 269 passengers and crew
members aboard.21 In subsequent lawsuits filed by the victims'
families, both KAL and the plaintiffs presented their version of the
facts to a jury.22 Although the facts are still disputed,23 the jury
accepted the following facts as recounted by the appellate court.24
A. The Disaster
Flight 007 originated in New York and briefly stopped in An-
chorage, Alaska before setting a course for Seoul, South Korea. 25
Before leaving Anchorage, the 007 flight crew incorrectly pro-
grammed the aircraft's Inertial Navigation System (INS).26 The
17. See Clyde Haberman, Korean Jetliner with 269 Aboard Missing Near Soviet Pa-
cific Island, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1983, at Al.
1& See id
19. See William R. Doerner et al., Atrocity in the Skies, TIME, Sept. 12, 1983, at 18.
20. See Robert D. McFadden, US. Says Soviets Down Korean Airliner, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 1983, at Al.
21. See Steven Strasser et al., A Ruthless Ambush in the Sky, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12,
1983, at 16. The victims of the disaster included 60 Americans. See id. at 17.
22 See In re KAL, 932 F.2d at 1475.
23. See, e.g., MICHEL BRUN, INCIDENT AT SAKHALIN (1995); see also David Pearson,
K.A.L. 007: What the U.S. Knew and When We Knew It, THE NATION, Aug. 18-25, 1984,
at 105; Perry S. Bechky, Mismanagement and Misinterpretation U.S. Judicial Implemen-
tation of the Warsaw Convention in Air Disaster Litigation, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 455, 503
n.228 (1995).
24. See In re KAL, 932 F.2d at 1475.
25. See id at 1477.
26. See id at 1478. The INS is a gyroscopic navigational device for calculating flight
position which the crew must properly program before takeoff by inputting the latitude
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crew noticed this error en route but, fearing suspension by KAL,
did not return to Anchorage. 27 Flight 007 flew progressively fur-
ther off course as it traveled from Anchorage towards Seoul.
28
The jet crossed over the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sea of Ok-
hotsk, and then over sensitive Soviet military facilities on the is-
land of Sakhalin.29 A Soviet Sukhoi-15 intercepted the 747 and
fired at least two missiles. 30 The 747 was struck and plummeted
into the Sea of Japan.31
The crew of Flight 007 knew the danger of flying into Soviet
airspace. 32 They were aware that, in a 1978 incident, KAL Flight
902 flew into Soviet airspace because of a navigational equipment
malfunction. 33 Soviet military aircraft intercepted KAL 902 and
blasted a hole in its fuselage, killing two passengers, injuring thir-
teen, and forcing the plane to crash-land on an ice-covered lake.
34
B. The Lawsuit
Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, as well as other
surviving family members, filed individual suits against KAL in
various federal courts. The courts subsequently transferred these
cases to a Judicial Panel of Multi-district Litigation court for con-
solidated proceedings on the common issue of liability. 35 The jury
concluded that the crew's actions, in conjunction with their knowl-
edge of Flight 902, constituted willful misconduct under Article 25
of the Warsaw Convention. 36 Consequently, KAL's liability for
damages could exceed the $75,000 liability cap of the Warsaw
and longitude of the gate where the aircraft is parked. See id.
27. See id.
2& See it at 1477-78.
29. See Doerner, supra note 19, at 14.
30. See Strasser, supra note 21, at 16.
31. See Doerner, supra note 19, at 18.
32. See id.
33. See The Worst, But Not the First, TIME, Sept. 12, 1983, at 17.
34. See id.
35. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 575 F. Supp. 342 (J.P.M.L.
1983).
36. See In re KAL, 932 F.2d. at 1478. The unofficial English translation of article
25(1) reads:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this conven-
tion which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful mis-
conduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court
to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful miscon-
duct.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. at 3020 (emphasis added).
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Convention. 37 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $50 million in puni-
tive damages. 38 The court held that, because of the wide disparity
in the plaintiffs' circumstances, the individual district courts must
determine all other damages on a case by case basis.39 On appeal,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
punitive damages award and remanded the cases to the district
courts for determination of compensatory damages.40 After hear-
ing the issue of damages in Zicherman and Mahalek's suit, a New
York jury found KAL liable for $375,000.41
KAL appealed the New York judgment.42 The court of ap-
peals reversed the judgment awarding the survivors' grief damages
(mental injury) and set aside the loss of society awards.43 The
court held that general maritime law, not DOHSA, controlled the
allowable damages.44 Citing general maritime law principles, the
court held that a plaintiff must be the decedent's dependent to re-
cover loss of society damages.45 The court found that because
Kole's sister, Mahalek, was not a dependent, she could not recover
loss of society damages. The court then remanded the case to de-
termine Zicherman's dependency status as the decedent's
mother.46
Zicherman and Mahalek petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court
for clarification and removal of the dependency requirement.
37. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 8.
38. See In re KAL, 932 F.2d at 1479.
39. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 43 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1994).
40. See In re KAL, 932 F.2d at 1485-87. The appellate court based this decision on
the Lockerbie air disaster case that held the Warsaw Convention does not contemplate
punitive damages. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928
F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie 11.
41. The jury awarded Zicherman and Mahalek the following damages:
Loss of Society - Zicherman $ 70,000
Loss of Society - Mahalek 28,000
Mental Injury - Zicherman 65,000
Mental Injury - Mahalek 96,000
Loss of Support and Inheritance - Zicherman 16,000
Decedent's Pain and Suffering - Kole's Estate 100.000
Total Compensatory Damages $375,000
See Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 21.
42. See id. at 18.
43. See id. at 21-23.
44. See id. at 21.
45. See id. at 22 (citing Wahlstom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084, 1092 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994)).
46. See id.
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KAL cross-petitioned, contending that the Warsaw Convention
does not permit loss of society damages whatsoever.47 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari, to decide the question of
whether the Warsaw Convention provides for loss of society dam-
ages for deaths on the high seas. 48 The Court then eliminated all
loss of society damages from the plaintiffs' recovery, holding that
the domestic law, otherwise applicable to the case, defines the
types of recoverable damages under the Warsaw Convention.49
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The development of international air transportation in the
early part of this century created many new legal problems.50 To
address these issues, two international conferences held in 1925
and 1929, established the Comitg International Technique
d'Experts Juridique Ariens (CITEJA). 51 CITEJA drafted the
Warsaw Convention 52 to unify the rules regarding the liability of
the airlines for damages sustained during international flights and
to supplant each signatory nation's differing domestic laws cover-
ing these issues.53 The Convention also sought to limit the poten-
tial liability of the airlines for accidents in order to protect an in-
dustry that was it its infancy at the time.54 With the latter goal in
mind, CITEJA capped liability at $8300.5 5 If, however, a court
finds that a defendant airline engaged in willful misconduct, then
the liability cap disappears. 56
The $8300 liability limit was extremely low, even in 1929.57
Numerous legal commentators, particularly those in the United
47. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 632.
4& See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
49. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 637.
50. See Andreas E. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497,498 (1967).
51. See id.
52. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5,49 Stat. at 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. at 12.
53. See LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED 5
(1988).
54. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 499.
55. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3006, 137 L.N.T.S. at 24.
The Convention itself sets the limit at 125,000 Poincard francs. See id. The United States
established the dollar equivalent at $8,300 in 1933. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 50, at 499 n.10.
56. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3006, 137 L.N.T.S. at 26.
57. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 499.
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States, criticized the limit.58 To address these complaints, the
member nations drafted and debated amendments to the Conven-
tion.59 The Hague Protocol, enacted in 1955, raised the liability
limit to the equivalent of $16,300.60 The United States, however,
still considered this limit too low and refused to ratify the Proto-
col. 61
The most significant change in the Warsaw system occurred in
1966, with the signing of the Montreal Agreement. 62 This agree-
ment constituted neither a new treaty nor an amendment to the
Warsaw Convention.63 The Montreal Agreement was actually a
special contract, enacted pursuant to Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention, between the United States government and the inter-
national air carriers operating within the United States.64 This
agreement raised the liability limit of the carrier for each passen-
ger to $75,000.65 In addition, the carriers agreed that they would
not raise as a defense that they or their agents had taken all neces-
sary measures to avoid the damage, or that taking such measures
was impossible.66 Thus, the Montreal Agreement substantially re-
defined the U.S. objectives of the Warsaw Convention and should
alter the U.S. interpretation of the Convention.67
The U.S. federal courts have interpreted the provisions of
Warsaw Convention on several occasions. Prior to Zicherman, the
58. See GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE
WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 37 (1977).
59. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 551.
60. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 37. The Hague Protocol established the liability
limit at 250,000 francs. See Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371,
381.
61. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 37.
62. Montreal Agreement, supra note 8. The combination of the Warsaw Convention
and the subsequent protocols and agreements is often referred to as the Warsaw system.
See Bechky, supra note 23, at 468. This Note adopts this practice.
63. See STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, 1 AVIATION TORT LAW §
11:19, at 679 (1978).
64. See id. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention authorizes carriers and passengers
to agree, by special contract, to a higher limit of liability. See Warsaw Convention, supra
note 5, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. at 3006, 137 L.N.T.S. at 24. For a list of the original signatories
to the Montreal Agreement see SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 63, § 11:19, at 676-79
n.27. Today, all carriers operating to and from the United States are deemed to be parties
to the Montreal Agreement. See 14 C.F.R. § 203 (1997).
65. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 8.
66. See id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 20(1), 49 Stat. at 3005, 137
L.N.T.S. at 24).
67. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
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U.S. Supreme Court had addressed the damages provisions con-
tained in the Warsaw Convention in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd.68
The Floyd case concerned an incident in which three engines on an
Eastern Airlines jet failed. The crew, however, managed to restart
one engine and narrowly avoid a crash-landing in the ocean.69
Subsequently, several passengers filed suit against Eastern Airlines
for mental anguish.70 The Court construed the Warsaw Conven-
tion's meaning of the term l6sion corporelle (bodily injury) and
concluded that an air carrier is not liable under the Warsaw Con-
vention for a purely mental injury that is not accompanied by any
physical injury. 71 The holding in this case is significant because of
the construction method the Court employed. In Floyd, the Court
looked to the French legal meaning for guidance to ascertain the
signatories' intentions.72
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention regarding the availability of pu-
nitive damages. In Lockerbie, the case concerning a terrorist
bombing of a jet over Scotland, the court held that the federal
definition of punitive damages does not include a compensatory
element.73 The court thus perceived punitive damages as incom-
patible with the Warsaw Convention's goal of compensation with-
out punishment. 74 Because the Lockerbie decision relied on the
federal definition of punitive damages, 75 the introduction by Zich-
erman of state law into the Warsaw system could make punitive
damages now available in some cases.
IV. THE FLIGHT 007 DECISION
In Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, the Supreme Court inter-
preted Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The Court con-
strued the words dommage survenu, which define the scope of the
carrier's liability. It addressed whether these words encompass
loss of society damages and, if they do, whether only dependents
68. 499 U.S. 530.
69. See id. at 533.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 552.
72. See id. at 536-42.
73. See Lockerbie 1, 928 F.2d at 1280.
74. See id. at 1288.
75. See id. at 1280.
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can recover those damages. 76
A. Domestic Law Determines Damages
The Court first considered the plain meaning of the English
words "damage" or "harm" to define dommage survenu.77 It re-
jected this definition as too inclusive, stating "[i]t cannot seriously
be maintained that Article 17 uses the term [dommage] in this
broadest sense, thus exploding tort liability beyond what any legal
system in the world allows, to the farthest reaches of what could be
denominated 'harm.' 78 The two alternative definitions the Court
considered were the French legal meaning as existed in 1929,
which the plaintiffs championed, and an empty meaning that do-
mestic law would fill.79
The Court quickly dismissed the French legal definition.80 It
acknowledged that although it had looked to French law in East-
ern Airlines v. Floyd81 to interpret the term lsion corporelle, and
in Air France v. Saks82 to interpret the term accident, those cases
relied upon French law only for a general meaning.83 The Court
provided the detailed meaning.84
The Court reasoned that the only realistic interpretation of
Article 17 would be to allow domestic law to determine the dam-
ages a plaintiff could recover. 85 The Court supported this conclu-
sion by examining Article 24 of the Convention, which refers the
parties' "respective rights" to domestic law.86 It argued that these
76. See Brief for Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Zicherman (Nos. 94-1361, 94-1477),
available in 1995 WL 330611, at *i [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
77. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 632.
78. I
79. See id. at 632-33.
80. See id at 633.
81. 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
82. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
83. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 632-33.
84. See iii
85. See id. at 634.
86. Article 24 states:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
Convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph
shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons
who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 24, 49 Stat. at 3020, (unofficial English transla-
tion).
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include substantive as well as procedural rights.87 The Court based
this conclusion on, among other things, an evaluation of the
travaux prparatoires (drafting papers) as recorded by CITEJA. 88
Citing two CITEJA reports, the Court found that the Warsaw
Convention drafters wholly deferred the issue of available dam-
ages to the forum jurisdiction. 8
9
The first CITEJA report stated that the type of damages sub-
ject to reparations "would be studied later on, when the issue of
knowing which are the persons, who according to the various na-
tional laws, have the right to take action against the carrier, will
have been elucidated." 90 The Court's opinion then cited a later
CITEJA report, which proposed that damages should be regulated
by private international law.91
Before concluding its analysis of Article 17, the Court briefly
surveyed the other signatory nations' interpretations. 92 The Court
noted that England, Germany and the Netherlands had adopted
domestic legislation to govern Warsaw Convention damages.93
Likewise, the Court noted that Canadian courts deny damages
other than those permitted by provincial law.94 The Court con-
cluded that "expert commentators are virtually unanimous that the
type of harm compensable is to be determined by domestic law."95
B. DOHSA is the Domestic Law that Guides this Case
Both parties agreed that U.S. law would govern the lawsuit's
damage inquiry if the Convention did not.96 Because the Court
determined that the Convention did not have its own definition of
damages, it considered how to define the term for the U.S.
87. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 634.
88. See id at 634-35.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 634 (quoting Henry de Vos, Report of the Third Session, CITEJA RE-
PORTER, May 15, 1928, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF LEGAL
EXPERTS ON AIR QUESTIONS 106 (1928)).
91. See id. at 634-35 (citing Henry de Vos, Report of the Third Session, CITEJA
REPORTER, Sept. 25, 1928, reprinted in SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW MINUTES, WARSAW 1929, at 255 (R. Horner & D. Le-
grez trans. 1975)).
92. See id. at 635.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
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courts.9 7 The Second Circuit had held that principles of general
maritime law should determine the types of damages available.
98
This would guarantee a uniform rule regardless of whether an ac-
cident occurred over land, territorial waters, or the high seas. 99
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the U.S. courts have no
authority to apply a common law rule to this type of case.100 The
Court noted that although Congress has the authority to legislate
such a law, it has not done so. 101 The Court determined that, in
the absence of a governing rule, it must address the damages ques-
tion as if the Warsaw Convention did not exist. 102
The Court found that because the Flight 007 disaster occurred
on the high seas, DOHSA properly defined damages. 103 It also
noted that, where DOHSA applies, neither state law nor general
maritime law can supplement the damages because DOHSA is a
federal statute preempting all other law.104 Furthermore, under
DOHSA, loss of society damages are not available. 105
97. See id. at 635-37.
98. See Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 21. Loss of society damages are a remedy available
under general maritime law. See Sea-Land Svcs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-88
(1974).
99. See Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 21-22.
100. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
101. See id.
102 See id.
103. See id. The relevant provision of DOHSA reads as follows:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the
United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit
for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the ex-
clusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent rela-
tive against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if
death had not ensued.
46 U.S.C. app. § 761.
104. See Zicherman, 166 S. Ct. at 636 (citing Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477
U.S. 207, 232-33 (1986), and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26
(1978)).
105. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 762. DOHSA provides:
The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be
apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they may sever-
ally have suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose representative
the suit is brought.
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V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ZICHERMAN DECISION
Following Zicherman, U.S. federal courts handed down deci-
sions involving nonpecuniary damages in two other cases arising
out of the Flight 007 disaster. In 1996, the Sixth Circuit decided
Bickel v. Korean Air Lines,10 6 and the Ninth Circuit decided
Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines.10 7 The Bickel court performed a
choice of law analysis and determined that U.S. law applied. 108
The court applied DOHSA, 109 and thus, reversed the award of
damages for loss of society, survivor's grief, and decedent's pain
and suffering. 110 As in Bickel, the Saavedra court found that
DOHSA applied and quickly dismissed the loss of society dam-
ages. 111 The court also eliminated the survivors' grief damages on
the same rationale.112 The court reasoned that because DOHSA
does not address predeath pain and suffering, courts cannot sup-
plement Congress' remedy and allow a general maritime survival
action that includes nonpecuniary damages. 113 The court, there-
fore, erased all nonpecuniary elements from the plaintiffs' recov-
ery. 114
Despite these windfalls for KAL, the Zicherman decision is
no clear-cut victory for the airline industry because DOHSA does
not always apply to cases involving an airline disaster. For exam-
ple, in September 1996, the Second Circuit heard an appeal con-
cerning the Lockerbie, Scotland disaster of 1988.115 In that case, a
bomb exploded in a suitcase on board Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, killing all 259 people aboard. 116 The jury determined
106. 83 F.3d 127 (6th Cir. 1996).
107. 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1996).
10& See Bickel, 83 F.3d at 131. The court performed this choice of law analysis to de-
termine which sovereign's law should apply in addition to the Warsaw Convention (e.g.,
U.S. law, Korean law, Japanese law, etc.). See id. In Zicherman, this was not an issue be-
cause both parties agreed that U.S. law should apply. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 635.
109. See Bickel, 83 F.3d at 131-32.
110. See id. The court subsequently reinstated the predeath pain and suffering award,
however, on essentially procedural grounds. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines, 96 F.3d 151
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
111. See Saavedra, 93 F.3d at 551-52.
112. See id. at 552.
113. See id. at 553-54 (citing Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 618, Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), and Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636).
114. The court disallowed over $2.5 million in nonpecuniary recovery. See id. at 550,
555.
115. See Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996).
116. See id. at 3.
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that Pan Am had engaged in willful misconduct by failing to com-
ply with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations con-
cerning baggage inspection. 117 The jury's finding of willful mis-
conduct removed the $75,000 liability limit. 118 Pan Am sought
review of the resulting $19 million verdict, which included dam-
ages for loss of society.
On review, the Second Circuit reasoned that Zicherman's
holding required an evaluation of the law which would control the
damage award if the Warsaw Convention did not. 119 The Court
held that "the applicable body of substantive law governing dam-
ages is the law of Ohio, the plaintiff's domicile and residence, not
federal maritime law."' 120 Under the Ohio wrongful death statute,
a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for loss of society,
loss of services, loss of support, and pre-judgment interest. 121
Thus, unlike in Bickel and Saavedra, the court upheld the entire
$19 million verdict, including the $5 million award for loss of soci-
ety.
These cases demonstrate that following the decision in Zich-
erman, the law regarding recoverable damages in airline disasters
is inconsistent and somewhat incoherent. The Zicherman opinion
distorts U.S. jurisprudence on international aviation into irrecon-
cilable legal rules. The types of compensation and its availability
for the victim of an international airline disaster post-Zicherman
depends upon a multitude of factors including: the country where
the action is filed; 122 the air carrier;123 whether the accident re-
sulted in death or merely injury;124 whether the accident occurred
over land, territorial waters, or over the high seas;125 and the loca-
tion of the plaintiff's home. 126 A plaintiff may even be able to ob-
117. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 811-
12 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995) [hereinafter Lockerbie II].
118. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. at 3006, 137 L.N.T.S. at
26.
119. See Pescatore, 97 F.3d at 4-5.
120. Id. at 15.
121. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.02, 1343.03(C) (Anderson 1994); see also
Pescatore, 97 F.3d at 15.
122. See Bickel, 83 F.3d at 130.
123. If the carrier has no U.S. operations, it will not be a party to the Montreal
Agreement. See 14 C.F.R. § 203 (1997).
124. DOHSA only applies to deaths on the high seas. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 761.
125. See id. Where DOHSA does not apply, the Second Circuit contends that state
law does. See Pescatore, 97 F.3d at 4-5.
126. If the court invokes state law, the plaintiff's domicile could determine which state
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tain punitive damages in cases governed by a state law that views
punitive damages as serving a compensatory function. 127 This
situation epitomizes "jungle-like chaos."'1 28 A proper analysis of
the text of Article 17 could certainly resolve this problem.
VI. ANALYSIS: THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 17
Various potential sources for the definition of dommage sur-
venu confronted the Court as it interpreted the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The Court finally chose to characterize the words as
"nothing more than a pass-through," allowing the various state
and federal statutes to provide the meaning. 129 This has resulted
in the chaotic approach described above. Consequently, this Note
offers an alternative interpretation.
The alternative approach uses the method directed by cus-
tomary international law, as declared in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, to interpret the Warsaw Convention.
130
Courts applying the Vienna Convention method must read the
ordinary meaning of the treaty terms to fulfill the treaty's pur-
pose. 131 Such an interpretation requires consideration of the con-
text of the Warsaw Convention from the United States' perspec-
tive. 132
The purposes of the Warsaw Convention, when examined in
this context, include uniformity of international legal rules, deter-
rence of willful misconduct, and equal treatment of international
airline passengers and air carriers. This Note asserts that the ordi-
nary meaning of the language, as captured by the dictionary defi-
nition, reflects the intended purposes of the Convention. The
pass-through definition of Zicherman, however, does not.
law applies. See id.
127. See Lockerbie 1, 928 F.2d at 1272. This view is a distinct minority. See id.
128. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
129. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
130. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969), arts. 31-32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion].
131. See id. art. 31(1), at 8 I.L.M. 691-92.
132. See id
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A. Treaty Interpretation: The Vienna Convention Approach
Treaty interpretation begins with a choice of interpretive
methods. In this regard, three schools of thought, subjective, tex-
tual, and teleological, dominate the field of international treaty in-
terpretation.133 The subjective approach aims to ascertain the
"real" intentions of the parties.134 The textual approach rigidly
adheres to the words of the treaty.135 The teleological approach
seeks to give effect to the object and purpose of the treaty.136
Commentators, however, often combine the various interpretive
methods. 137 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provide such a synthesis. 138 It states that "a treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose."'1 39
The Vienna Convention method of interpretation includes
elements from the three primary theories of treaty interpretation.
It follows the textual method by first looking to the objective
meaning of the treaty's words. It is teleological because it seeks to
fulfill the treaty's intended purpose. Finally, it is subjective as it
attempts to ensure the signatories' contemplated result.
Although the United States did not sign the Vienna Conven-
tion, the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State recog-
nized the Vienna Convention as declaratory of customary interna-
tional law.140 Because of the importance of the Vienna
Convention approach, 141 this Note uses its method as a guide to
the interpretation of the Warsaw Convention.
133. See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
115 (1984); see also MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATIES 327 (1985) (discussing two additional methods: the contextual approach, which
reads the Treaty in its "nearer and wider context;" and the logical method, which favors
rational techniques of reasoning and abstract legal principles).
134. See SINCLAIR, supra note 133, at 115.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See VILLIGER, supra note 133, at 327.
138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 130, arts. 31-32, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92.
139. Id. art. 31(1), 8 I.L.M. at 691.
140. See VILLIGER, supra note 133, at 337; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 cmt. a (1987). The Supreme
Court has expressly held customary international law to be binding on the United States.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
141. See Bechky, supra note 23, at 470-71.
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B. The United States' Perspective
To ascertain the objectives in using the words dommage sur-
venu, the interpreter must determine the proper perspective. The
threshold question is whether those words have their own meaning
in the treaty applicable to all signatories, or the words should de-
rive their meaning from the various domestic laws. If the drafters
intended only one meaning for the term regardless of the forum
court, the task falls on the interpreter to find "the shared expecta-
tions of the contracting parties" 142 in using that term. If, on the
other hand, the drafters intended for each domestic court to pro-
vide its own definition, the appropriate focus is on the forum na-
tion's objectives in signing the treaty.
The Zicherman Court's conclusion that the forum nation's
domestic law should determine the recoverable damages resulted
from its examination of Article 24 of the Convention, the travaux
preparatoires, the post-ratification conduct of other signatories,
and the "virtually unanimous" opinion of expert commentators. 143
Such a result is reasonable because signatory nations would likely
only join a treaty that contemplates a determination of compensa-
tion for harms found in their own legal systems. 144 In 1929, several
of the Convention signatory nations had not recognized nonpecu-
niary damages as an element of wrongful death recovery.145
Recourse to domestic law, however, does not necessarily lead
to the definition of dommage survenu as a "pass-through. ' 146 The
Court may instead give the words their own single meaning within
the treaty without bringing in other domestic laws. The Court
could only justify its pass-through characterization if that result
fulfilled the purposes of the Warsaw Convention. The pass-
through definition, however, may actually defeat the purposes of
the Convention depending upon the state and federal statute that
is triggered. For example, the use of DOHSA to define the com-
pensable harm limits the available recovery to only pecuniary
loss, 147 thus, insufficiently deterring willful misconduct and failing
142. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,399 (1985).
143. Zichermnan, 116 S. Ct. at 633-35.
144. See id at 633.
145. See i& (identifying Czechoslavakia, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the
Soviet Union, and Sweden as nations that did not recognize such harm until many years
after the Treaty's signing).
146. See iti at 636.
147. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978).
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to adequately protect the passengers' interests. In addition, the
pass-through methodology itself defeats the purpose of unifying
international air transportation law.
The Court justified the incorporation of U.S. laws into the
Warsaw Convention by claiming that U.S. courts have no authority
to do otherwise. The Court declared that "the Convention itself
contains no rule of law governing the present question; nor does it
empower us to develop some common-law rule-under cover of
general admiralty law or otherwise-that will supersede the nor-
mal federal disposition."'1 48 By inquiring whether the Warsaw
Convention "empowers" the Court to give meaning to the Con-
vention's terms, the Court ignores its inherent authority. Since
medieval times, common law nations have given courts the task of
interpreting statutes.149 A treaty, such as the Warsaw Convention,
is the legal equivalent of a federal statute. 150 Furthermore, the
Court's direct interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, which
Congress ratified in 1929, would preempt the provisions of
DOHSA, which Congress enacted in 1920.151 While the resulting
meanings have varied somewhat, common law courts in other na-
tions have recognized their responsibility to give meaning to the
words of the Convention. 152
148. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
149. See, e.g., Heyden's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584). Justice Scalia should
agree, having stated that an ambiguity in a statute in which Congress intended a particular
result, but was not clear, is genuinely a question of law for the courts to properly resolve.
See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989).
150. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 4-5, at 225
(1988) (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). The Warsaw Conven-
tion is reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1994).
151. See TRIBE, supra note 150, at 226 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
152- See Preston v. Hunting Air Transp. Ltd., 1 Q.B. 454, 461 (1956) (U.K.)
(interpreting dommage survenu to encompass nonpecuniary injury); McKenna v. Avior
Pty Ltd. (1981) W.A.R. 255 (W.A. Sup. Ct) (Austl.) (interpreting dommage survenu to
include only injuries capable of evaluation in monetary terms).
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C. The Context of the Treaty: The Montreal Agreement
The Montreal Agreement 153 best defines the current context
of the Warsaw Convention. 154 To understand the Warsaw Con-
vention, one must appreciate the effect of the Montreal Agree-
ment and the circumstances surrounding its adoption. In the
United States, the Montreal Agreement changed the character of
the Warsaw Convention almost overnight. 155  The Montreal
Agreement clearly illustrates the United States' attitude toward
the Convention's purpose. Although the Agreement did not alter
the language of Article 17, "it provide[d] decisive evidence of the
goals and expectations currently shared by the parties to the War-
saw Convention." 1
56
Although "the United States had nothing to do with formula-
tion of the Convention and had adhered rather than ratified,
157 it
executed the Montreal Agreement with the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). 158 In the Agreement, the United
States agreed to withdraw its threatened denunciation of the War-
saw Convention, while the airlines agreed to raise the limits of li-
ability and waive their Article 20 defenses. 159 The United States
153. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 8.
154. Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention states:
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an in-
strument related to the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. 31(2), 8 I.L.M. at 692. The Montreal Agreement
was an instrument made in connection with the United States' withdrawal of its notice of
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at
596. The "special contract" provision in Article 22 of the Convention indicates the signa-
tories' acceptance of such agreements. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 22(1),
49 Stat. at 3006, 137 L.N.T.S. at 24.
155. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 601.
156. Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
890 (1976).
157. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 502. The Lowenfeld and Mendel-
sohn article provides insightful analysis and is particularly relevant because both authors
were intimately involved in the events surrounding the United States' denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention and subsequent adoption of the Montreal Agreement. See id. at 497.
158. See id at 596.
159. See id. Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention reads:
The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or
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negotiated the Montreal Agreement to pacify the strong U.S. pub-
lic opinion against the low liability limits. 160 The U.S. government
had unsuccessfully attempted to pressure other nations to secure
higher limits. 161 Also motivating the Agreement and its goals and
expectations was the realization in the United States that,
throughout the world, the airline industry had progressed substan-
tially, thus creating great concern for the passengers' interests. 162
D. The Purposes of the Treaty
The Montreal Agreement establishes the United States' ob-
jectives toward the Treaty purposes. Nevertheless, because the
United States did accede to the original Convention in 1934,163 the
intentions of the original drafters also influence the Treaty's inter-
pretation. An analysis of the Convention's objectives reveals a
concern for uniformity of legal rules, deterrence of willful miscon-
duct, and a balance between the rights of passengers and the rights
of airlines.
1. Uniformity
As evidenced by its title, the Warsaw Convention sought to
unify international legal rules.164 The Warsaw Convention estab-
lishes enforcement rules for the signatories' domestic courts.
Without such a unified approach, neither the international traveler
nor the airline knows which law will apply to any given flight.
Complete international uniformity is, nevertheless, probably
unattainable for all aspects of the Convention.165 Such inconsis-
tency should not be compounded by forcing the application of the
them to take such measures.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 20(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, (unofficial English transla-
tion).
160. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 37.
161. See id
162 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 507.
163. See SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 63, § 11:4, at 638.
164. The official title of the Treaty is the "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air." Warsaw Convention, supra note
5, 49 Stat. at 3014 (unofficial English translation).
165. The extent of the carrier's liability in cases without willful misconduct, for exam-
ple, may vary significantly, depending upon the laws of the nation where the plaintiff files
suit. The airline may be subject to the limits of the original Convention, the Hague Pro-
tocol, or the Montreal Agreement. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 37. This situation could
change with the possible global acceptance of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. See
IATA Passenger Liability Agreements-On Track to Worldwide Implementation, IATA
Press Release (Jan. 15,1997) (visited Oct. 21,1997) <http://www.iata.org/pr/Prliab97.htm>.
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various state statutes. The various state laws create the same po-
tential for inequality of passenger treatment as do the various in-
ternational legal systems. 166 In Reed v. Wiser,167 the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals coined the term "jungle-like chaos"'168 to
describe the choice of law situation that arises if both the laws of
the various states and the various nations control the Warsaw
Convention's liability rules.169 In the Zicherman case, KAL ar-
gued that the Warsaw Convention, as a federal treaty, "should be
interpreted under one uniform law" within the United States.170
Of course, KAL contended that the uniform law should include
only pecuniary damages and that the Court should derive this law
by analogy to DOHSA.171 While such an approach would create
uniformity, it fails to satisfy the other purposes of the Convention.
The Second Circuit in Zicherman could not "reconcile DOHSA's
limitation of damages to pecuniary loss with the 'aim of the Con-
vention's drafters and signatories ... to provide full compensatory
damages for any injuries or death covered by the Convention' in-
cluding non-pecuniary loss."' 1
72
2. Deterring Willful Misconduct
When first established, the Warsaw Convention sought to pro-
tect the infant air transportation industry.173 The original signato-
ries felt that the fledgling industry could not attract capital unless
protected from legal liability for catastrophic accidents. 174 This
policy of protecting the airline industry no longer applies because
of the current financial strength of the industry.175 This policy is
also wholly irrelevant when a plaintiff can prove that an airline en-
166. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 325 cmt. d (discussing the need to construe
treaties uniformly regardless of the legal systems of the signatories).
167. 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
168. Id at 1092.
169. See id at 1091 n.181
170. Respondent's Oral Argument, Zicherman (Nos. 94-1361, 94-1477), available in
1995 WL 672836, at *28-29.
171. See id. at *29.
172 Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 22 (quoting Lockerbie 11, 37 F.2d at 829).
173. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 499.
174. See id.
175. See SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 63, § 11:4, at 636-37 (citing Reed v. Wiser,
414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977)).
But see, Greg Hill, Comment, Terror in the Sky: Does Terrorism Return Airlines to an In-
fant Industry? Does the Warsaw Convention Liability Limit Fly High Again to Protect
Vulnerable Airlines?, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 633 (1997).
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gaged in willful misconduct. In the case of willful misconduct, the
Convention's goal is to deter such conduct rather than protect the
airline.
The Warsaw Convention seeks to deter willful misconduct by
providing for the removal of the liability cap in such cases. 176 The
United States placed great importance on the willful misconduct
exception as far back as the Hague Conference in 1955.177 The
consequences alone of willful misconduct should sufficiently deter
such behavior by the flight crew. The Convention, however, aims
its deterrence effect at the airline, rather than the crew. The risk
that courts will force the airlines to provide full compensation to
victims should deter actions, such as those engaged by KAL in the
Flight 007 case 178 and by Pan Am in the Lockerbie case. 179 A limi-
tation to pecuniary damages, however, would provide "an unin-
tended double layer of liability protection" for the airline indus-
try. 180 Such restrictions on damages would limit the airlines'
liability even in cases of willful misconduct, and insufficiently deter
such conduct.
3. The Interests of Passengers
In molding the Warsaw Convention's liability rules into the
desired form, the United States had the interests of both passen-
gers and carriers in mind. The Montreal Agreement reflects the
strongest evidence that "[t]he Convention embodies a trade-off
between plaintiff passengers and defendant airlines. ' 181 This
Agreement demonstrates the United States' intent to use the War-
saw system to protect passengers from the present day hazards of
air travel and to spread the cost of air transportation among all
passengers. 182
176. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. at 3006, 137 L.N.T.S. at
26.
177. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 506.
178. The KAL Flight 007 crew failed to correct their navigation error because of fear
of discipline by the airline. See In re KAL, 932 F.2d at 1478.
179. Terrorists gained access to the Lockerbie jet because of the airline's failure to
comply with FAA rules. See Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 811-12.
180. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 76, at *12.
181. Bechky, supra note 23, at 458.
182 See Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 890 (1976); see also Husserl v. Swiss Air Tramp., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff d, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973). In Husserl, the court stated:
The Warsaw Convention as modified functions to redistribute the costs involved
in air transportation: the carrier is best qualified initially to develop defensive
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In Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet,183 the Supreme Court in-
cluded loss of society damages in general maritime law.184 The
Court reasoned that it must include these damages to "shape the
remedy to comport with the humanitarian policy of the maritime
law to show 'special solicitude' for those who are injured within its
jurisdiction."'1 85 The humanitarian policy promoted by Gaudet is
equally relevant in the context of international air travel. The Is-
raeli Supreme Court also voiced this goal when it construed the
Warsaw Convention to allow recovery for purely psychic inju-
ries. 186 The court based this conclusion on a "desirable jurispru-
dential policy" (la politique jurisprudentielle souhaitable) that fa-
vors an expansive reading of Article 17.187 The court cited the
development of the aviation industry as one factor that led to this
result. 188 With the growth of the airline industry, full compensa-
tion is essential for injured passengers to achieve equal treatment
with the carriers, which enjoy limited liability for most accidents.
E. The Text in Light of the Purpose: The Ordinary Meaning
The Vienna Convention directs the reading of the Treaty
terms in context and in light of the object and purpose of the Con-
vention.189 The conflict centers on the French term dommage sur-
venu.190 An ordinary French-English dictionary translates dom-
mage as "damage, injury, hurt, detriment, loss, [or] harm."'191
When read with a consideration for the context and purposes as
directed by the Vienna Convention, this dictionary definition fur-
thers the Warsaw Convention's intent.
The ordinary meaning of dommage survenu, which encom-
mechanisms to avoid such incidents, since it physically controls the aircraft and
access to it; it is likewise the party most capable of assessing and insuring against
the risks associated with air transportation; finally, it is the party most able to
distribute efficiently the costs of the first two steps.
Husserl, 651 F. Supp. at 707.
183. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
184. See id. at 587-88.
185. Id. at 588.
186. See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 551 (citing Cie Air France v. Teichner, 39 REVUE
FRANCAISE DE DROIT AtRIEN 243, 23 EUR. TR. L. 102 (original in French)).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 31(1), 8 I.L.M. at 691-92.
190. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3005, 137 L.N.T.S at 22.
French is the official language of the Warsaw Convention. See id. art. 36, 49 Stat. at 3008,
137 L.N.T.S. at 30.
191. CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY 266 (1965).
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passes loss of society damages, satisfies the purposes of the War-
saw Convention as intended by both the original drafters and the
United States. A single federal interpretation imposes a uniform
system of liability upon all U.S. courts for any accident occurring
in international air transportation. A broader meaning fulfills the
purpose of deterring willful misconduct because it avoids an addi-
tional layer of protection for the perpetrator airline, even after its
misconduct lifts the liability limits. Finally, a less rigid interpreta-
tion of the scope of the damages equalizes burdens between the
passengers and the airlines which the United States views as a key
purpose of the Convention. Allowing full recovery of damages,
when willful misconduct is proven, counterbalances the fixed li-
ability limits enjoyed by the airlines. Holding an airline liable for
all of the damage that it causes when it commits willful miscon-
duct, is a small price to pay for this privilege.
Another signatory's court has arrived at a similar conclusion.
In Preston v. Hunting Air Transport Ltd.,192 a British court ad-
dressed the availability of nonpecuniary damages under the War-
saw Convention. Although the court did not explicitly detail its
analysis, it essentially looked at the plain meaning by simply ask-
ing if the plaintiffs sustained any damage as a result of the death of
their mother.193 The court subsequently held that the Warsaw
Convention allows the recovery of nonpecuniary damages. 194
The Zicherman Court, however, finds the plain meaning to be
considerably too broad. 195 It maintains that this definition would
incorrectly provide compensation for even "the mental distress of
some stranger who reads about Kole's death in the paper."'1 96 The
192. 1 Q.B. 454 (1956).
193. See id. at 461.
194. See id.
195. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 632. Justice Scalia, the author of the Zicherman
opinion, ordinarily advocates an objective textualist approach. See Antonin Scalia, Com-
mon-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in In-
terpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 23-25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). He has stated that "the main
danger in judicial interpretation . . . of any law is that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law." Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849, 863 (1989). Despite this warning, Scalia's decisions show that he often manipu-
lates his textualist doctrine to infect the opinions with his personal conservative view-
point. See Steven A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93,
110-21 (1995) (detailing Justice Scalia's textualist malpractice and conservative bias, par-
ticularly in the civil rights area).
196. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 632.
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Court, however, overlooks Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention
that clearly states that domestic law determines "the persons who
have the right to bring suit. ' 197 Thus, unless the applicable law
provides a cause of action for a newspaper-reading stranger, the
Court's fears are overstated. The drafters of the Warsaw Conven-
tion explicitly provided for the forum nation's laws to resolve pro-
cedural issues, such as permissible plaintiffs.
The Court could legitimately look to DOHSA for the standing
requirements. DOHSA states that a personal representative of the
decedent may only bring suit "for the exclusive benefit of the de-
cedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative." 198
Therefore, in the Zicherman case, Muriel Kole's mother should re-
tain her damage award. Kole's sister, however, would need to
prove dependency in order to collect. 199
VII. CONCLUSION/ RECOMMENDATION
The internationally accepted Vienna Convention approach to
treaty interpretation leads to the conclusion that the ordinary
meaning of dommage survenu best fulfills the Warsaw Convention
framers' intent. Reading the Treaty terms in the context of the
Montreal Agreement reveals that the United States' Treaty objec-
tives are deterrence of willful misconduct, uniformity of interna-
tional legal rules, and the achievement of equity between passen-
gers and airlines. The Zicherman Court's failure to interpret
"damages" within the Convention satisfies none of the Treaty's
purposes.
Absent an overruling decision, federal legislation is the only
possible solution to correct the current inconsistencies in the War-
saw Convention's interpretation. The Zicherman Court invited
legislation, stating, "Congress may choose to enact special provi-
sions applicable to Warsaw-Convention cases, as some countries
have done. ' 200 Other countries have passed Warsaw Convention
legislation. The United Kingdom, for example, enacted legislation
which was designed to give the Treaty effect within the British le-
197. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 24, 49 Stat. at 3020, (unofficial English
translation).
198. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761.
199. This result potentially reduces the total damage award in the Zicherman case by
$28,000. See Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 21.
200. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
19971 189
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
gal system. 20 1 This legislation did not define dommage survenu,
properly leaving that task for the judiciary. Likewise, Canada en-
acted the same type of statute.202 Australia enacted legislation
that did address the scope of damages under the Convention,
stating that "[iln awarding damages, the court or jury is not limited
to the financial loss resulting from the death of the passenger.
'20 3
The Australian courts still needed to resolve whether those dam-
ages could be nonpecuniary. 20 4 In the United States, however, the
Supreme Court has declared the Warsaw Convention to be self-
executing,205 thus, removing the need for such implementing legis-
lation.
This Note contends that Congress should supplement the
Warsaw Convention. In order to fulfill the purposes of the Con-
vention, Congress should pass a "gap-filling" or "clarifying" stat-
ute to uniformly resolve those issues on which the Convention is
silent and the Court refuses to interpret. This statute should pro-
vide for pecuniary damages, such as loss of support and services
based on the decedent's projected life expectancy, funeral ex-
penses, loss of inheritance (i.e., prospective net accumulations of
the estate), and interest on these damages. In addition, the statute
should provide for nonpecuniary damages such as loss of society of
the decedent,206 predeath pain and suffering of the decedent, and
mental anguish incurred by the plaintiff. As a measure to assure
the necessary uniformity, Congress should also use such a statute
to establish common procedural rules for all Warsaw Convention
cases, including a determination of the standing requirements.
The Supreme Court has created anarchy in aviation law with
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines. Congress has the ability to im-
plement international aviation rules that are consistent with the
goals of the Warsaw Convention and, thus, reflect the interpreta-
201. See Carriage by Air Act 1961 (9&10 Eliz 2 ch. 27) (Eng.); see also, SPEISER &
KRAUSE, supra note 63, §§ 11:22-23, at 689-94 (discussing implementing legislation in
Ireland, India, New Zealand, and Pakistan).
202. See Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. ch. C-14, § 1 (1985) (Can.).
203. Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act, 1959, § 12(8) (Austi.).
204. See McKenna v. Avior Pty Ltd. (1981) W.A.R. 255 (W.A. Sup. Ct) (Austl.).
205. See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984). A self-
executing treaty is one that does not require congressional action (implementing legisla-
tion) in order to have domestic legal effect. See TRIBE, supra note 150, at 226.
206. Loss of society should include loss of companionship, consortium, care, assistance,
attention, protection, advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, and education.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B)(3) (Anderson 1994).
[Vol. 20:165190
International Aviation Law Anarchy
tion of the Convention as directed by customary international law.
Through legislation, Congress can achieve uniformity, deter the
willful misconduct of the air carriers, and balance the rights of the
passengers with those of the carriers.
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